I. The Number Problem
Many nonconsequentialists have been puzzling over what has come to be known as the Number Problem, which is how to show that the greater number in a rescue situation should be saved without aggregating the claims of the many, a typical kind of consequentialist move that seems to violate the separateness of persons.
1 That is, suppose there are two islands, one with one person, A, and the other with two people, B&C. There is a tsunami and both islands will soon be immersed in water, killing whoever is on the island. You only have time to go to one of the islands to rescue the people on it. Other things being equal, e.g., assume that there is no morally relevant difference (e.g. special relationship or prior agreements) between these individuals. To which island should you go?
For consequentialists, the answer seems simple: Save the greater number because consequentialism aims to produce the best state of affairs and, other things being equal, more aggregate lives saved may be a better state of affairs than fewer lives saved. 2 Antinumber advocates such as John Taurek argue, on the other hand, that there is no reason to save the greater number per se, because none of the individuals on either island can claim that it is any worse for him to die than it is for the others. 3 As Taurek explains, "Five individuals each losing his life does not add up to anyone's experiencing a loss five times greater than the loss suffered by any of the five." 4 As a possible solution, Taurek   2 suggests that perhaps one could flip a coin to decide whether to save the one or the larger group.
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Nonconsequentialists who do not want to aggregate the claims of the many, because it seems to violate the separateness of persons -and who, at the same time, do not accept, as Taurek does, that numbers do not matter -have in recent years advanced several novel solutions to the Number Problem. 6 Let us call these nonconsequentialists "pro-number nonconsequentialists." Others have however argued that the solutions advanced by the pro-number nonconsequentialists do not actually solve the Number Problem, because these solutions covertly involve combining the claims of the greater number. 7 In this paper, I shall argue that pro-number nonconsequentialists may be making the task more difficult than necessary and that there may be a simpler nonconsequentialist solution to the Number Problem. In particular, I shall argue that a nonconsequentialist can permit aggregation and still respect the separateness of persons.
II. The Kamm-Scanlon Argument and the Weighted Lottery Argument
I begin by giving an overview of two of the best known pro-number nonconsequentialist solutions: the Kamm-Scanlon Argument and the Weighted Lottery Argument.
Developed by Frances Kamm and incorporated into a contractualist framework by On its most well-known manifestation, the Weighted Lottery Argument says that if everyone has an equally strong claim to being saved, but if we cannot satisfy the claims equally, then we should give each a 1/(the number of people) chance to be saved. 18 For example, in the case of saving either A or B&C, we cannot save all three. Given this, we should, according to the Weighted Lottery Argument, give each a 1/3 chance of being saved. According to some of its advocates, the weighted lottery then solves the Number Problem if one accepts that if and when B is selected, then having reached B, one should also save C. 19 Or, if and when C is selected, then having reached C, one should also save B. In other words, the Number Problem is allegedly solved on this view, because each has been given a 1/(the number of people) chance, and because those in the group with the greater number will stand a better chance of benefiting from the good luck of 6 someone in that group. As one of its advocates says, "depending on the numbers, it ismore, much more, vastly more -likely that the many will be saved." It might also be pointed out that the fact that the weighted lottery makes it more likely than not -perhaps even overwhelmingly likely -that the greater number will be saved is insufficient to establish that the Weighted Lottery Argument solves the Number Problem, given that the Number Problem is that of explaining why we should always save the greater number in these cases. 21 Again, advocates of the weighted lottery might bite the bullet and argue that this is the best available solution to the Number Problem.
There may be other problems with the Weighted Lottery Argument, but I shall not explore them here. 22 For, the Kamm-Scanlon Argument and the Weighted Lottery
Argument also face what might be called the Separateness of Persons Objection.
III. A Separateness of Persons Objection
It might seem ironic that the Kamm-Scanlon Argument and the Weighted Lottery
Argument would have problems with the Separateness of Persons Objection. After all, following Rawls's criticism that utilitarian aggregation, which seems to presuppose a notion of an overall good, is defective because it does not respect the distinctiveness of 7 persons, and Nagel's argument that an impartial concern for persons is best grounded in pairwise comparison rather than in the aggregation of the claims of separate individuals, The problem with PAC though is that its stopping point seems arbitrary. While it permits comparison, balancing, substitution and division, it refuses to permit aggregation.
One might ask, why not? If equal claims can be interpersonally substituted and divided, why can they not be aggregated? They would still be equal claims that are aggregated.
Of course, pro-number nonconsequentialists have shied away from aggregation because they think that it violates the separateness of persons. But it seems that pairwise interpersonal comparison, balancing, substitution, and division may also do the same.
Echoing Rawls's discussion of this matter, Robert Nozick explains the problem of making a person undergo some sacrifice for some 'overbalancing' good:
Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm: we go to the dentist to avoid worse suffering later; we do some unpleasant work for its results . . . In each case, some cost is borne for the sake of the greater overall good. Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? . . . There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more . . . To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him. . . .
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To give just one example, notice how easily one can transform this passage into an objection to substituting the equivalent good of one individual for another:
Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for an equivalent benefit or to avoid an equivalent harm: we do some unpleasant work now so that we would not have to do it later . . . some cost is borne for the sake of 
V. A Simple Solution to the Number Problem
At this point, pro-number nonconsequentialists might believe that they are in a dilemma:
Given the Arbitrariness Objection, it might seem that if they still reject aggregation, then they must also reject pairwise interpersonal comparison, substitution, and the like. If so, they would in effect be embracing the Taurekean position that numbers do not count. Or, it might seem that they must embrace aggregation and thereby whole-sale consequentialism. I shall now argue that this dilemma may be more apparent than real.
There may be an easy way out for pro-number nonconsequentialists, namely, nonconsequentialists can accept aggregation and still respect the separateness of persons.
How is this possible?
Intuitively, it seems that what distinguishes nonconsequentialism from consequentialism (of the simpler sort at least) is not that states of affairs do not matter at all, but that there are other considerations that also matter such as an agent's intentions, justice, and so on. Indeed, as Rawls himself says, "All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness." 33 For example, consider the Riot Case in which a thousand people will die from a riot unless one prosecutes an distinctive about persons is not that they are incommensurable or that they each embody an equal claim that cannot be aggregated but can be substituted, compared and so on; but that they are moral agents capable of deliberating and being persuaded by moral reasons.
Therefore, on PAA, we respect individuals as separate persons when we treat them not just as claimants to be balanced and weighed, but as rational, moral agents who can respond to reasons. This means that even if aggregation presupposes a notion of an overall good, and aggregation is taken into consideration in our moral deliberation, since individual moral agents remain the sources of normativity on PAA, the employment of aggregation must ultimately be justifiable to each moral agent from her point of view. of which is necessarily consequentialist. 34 In any case, I suspect that herein lies one real difference between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism. 35 That is, the problem of the prioritizing numbers versus other values, and not of whether aggregation is permissible, is one factor in determining whether one is a consequentialist or not. should flip a coin in such a case, because curing C's sore throat is an "irrelevant utility,"
given that the alternative would deprive A of her 50 percent chance of being saved. The employment of the idea of an irrelevant utility, which leads to a different recommendation than employing the Kamm-Scanlon Balancing/Tiebreaking Approach alone, shows that the former is independent of the latter. Hence, to deal with some of the implications of aggregation, arguably nonconsequentialists have resources to constrain aggregation without rejecting it.
VI. Conclusion
Pro-number nonconsequentialists have been puzzling over how to show that the greater number in a rescue situation should be saved without aggregating the claims of the many, a typical kind of consequentialist move that seems to violate the separateness of persons.
In this paper, I argued that pro-number nonconsequentialists may be making the tasks more difficult than necessary because on the Standard Picture of nonconsequentialism, a nonconsequentialist can allow aggregation and still respect the separateness of persons.
In particular, I argued that on the Standard Picture, what distinguishes nonconsequentialists from consequentialists is not that numbers and aggregation do not matter, but that they matter only as one input among many in a deliberative, practical
reasoning process about what a moral agent ought to do. For a nonconsequentialist, other considerations such as an agent's intentions, justice, and so on, could also be relevant. 2 Roger Crisp has noted though that even consequentialism may not always require one to save the greater number in the tsunami case, as such a requirement assumes that the population before the tsunami is optimal, but we may just have no clue regarding whether saving more lives will produce the best state of affairs.
3 Taurek, J. "Should the Numbers Count?" Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1977): 293-316. 4 Taurek, "Should the Numbers Count?," p. 307. 5 Taurek, "Should the Numbers Count?," p. 303.
precisely when C is in a larger group than B, and that even if the choice were Bs he too should prefer that C be spare his loss, that is, the greater number should be saved? Michael Otsuka has suggested though that Taurek can reject this line of thought by drawing a distinction between pairwise comparisons (which do not involve any appeal to groups) and those comparisons that involve appeals to groups. Let me preface by noting that I do not think that the existence of the view that each person is incommensurable necessarily depends on Taurek's having held this view. Indeed, as I proceed to point out in the main text, other people have also held this view. This said, let me express some reservations regarding this interpretation of Taurek. In particular, elsewhere, Otsuka has argued that the anti-number position leads to a choice-
